



Preface: Double Jeopardy in Washington
and Beyond
Justice Philip A. Talmadge*
Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto.1
No one ought be punished twice for one offense.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The prohibition against double jeopardy is of ancient lineage in
western civilization. In a ringing and scholarly dissent that rewards
reflection, Justice Hugo Black said:
Fear and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice
for the same conduct is one of the oldest ideas found in western
civilization. Its roots run deep into Greek and Roman times. Even
in the Dark Ages, when so many other principles of justice were
lost, the idea that one trial and one punishment were enough
remained alive through the canon law and the teachings of the early
Christian writers. By the thirteenth century it seems to have been
firmly established in England, where it came to be considered as a
"universal maxim of the common law." It is not surprising,
therefore, that the principle was brought to this country by the
earliest settlers as part of their heritage of freedom, and that it has
been recognized here as fundamental again and again. Today it is
found, in varying forms, not only in the Federal Constitution, but
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in the jurisprudence or constitutions of every State, as well as most
foreign nations. It has, in fact, been described as a part of all
advanced systems of law and as one of those universal principles "of
reason, justice, and conscience, of which Cicero said: 'Nor is it one
thing at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another in the
future, but among all nations it is the same.' While some writers
have explained the opposition to double prosecutions by emphasiz-
ing the injustice inherent in two punishments for the same act, and
others have stressed the dangers to the innocent from allowing the
full power of the state to be brought against them in two trials, the
basic and recurring theme has always simply been that it is wrong
for a man to "be brought into Danger for the same Offence more
than once." Few principles have been more deeply "rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people."3
Because the prohibition against placing someone in double
jeopardy is so deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, double jeopardy
challenges have been prevalent throughout our nation's history. This
Preface highlights some of the major themes involved in such double
jeopardy challenges.
Section II of this Preface briefly describes the protections offered
by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Section III touches upon one of the
key issues in double jeopardy cases-the determination of what actions
constitute the "same offense." Section IV addresses some recent
developments in double jeopardy law and introduces a rapidly-growing
question in modern double jeopardy cases: Whether the double
jeopardy protections apply in the context of parallel criminal prosecu-
tions and civil forfeiture actions.
II. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTIONS
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the federal constitution provides
that no person shall be "subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb."4  The Washington Constitution states,
"No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence
against himself, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."'
The Washington Supreme Court recently settled a long-standing issue
by holding that "Const. art. 1, § 9 is given the same interpretation the
3. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-55 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (numerous
footnotes citing biblical, canonical, ancient, medieval English, and American colonial law omitted).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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[United States] Supreme Court gives to the double jeopardy clause in
the Fifth Amendment."1
6
Both double jeopardy clauses provide three different protections.
First, they protect against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal.' Second, they protect against a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction.' And third, they protect against
multiple punishments for the same offense."0
III. "SAME OFFENSE"
In most double jeopardy cases, the key issue is what actions
constitute the "same offense." As the Washington Supreme Court said
in State v. Laviollette," in double jeopardy determinations, "perhaps
one of the most vexing issues has been to determine what 'the same
offense' means."2 The United States Supreme Court has found the
problem of determining the meaning of same offense no less troubling
and difficult. In United States v. Dixon, 3 a fractious 5-4 decision in
which only Justice Kennedy fully joined Justice Scalia's majority
opinion and four other Justices wrote separately to concur and dissent,
the Court overruled a decision it had made just three years earlier
regarding the proper test for evaluating the same offense require-
ment. 4 Dixon reestablished the Blockburger'5 test as the appropriate
test for analyzing the double jeopardy same offense issue. 6 The
Blockburger, or "same elements," test provides where the same act
violates two distinct statutory provisions, if each provision requires
6. State v. Gocken, 127 Wash. 2d 95, 109, 896 P.2d 1267, 1274 (1995). In Gocken, the
defendant's subsequent conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver was not
barred by his prior plea to a drug paraphernalia charge, nor was the second defendant's conviction
for felony theft barred by a prior plea to criminal conspiracy. Id. at 108, 896 P.2d at 1273.
7. See Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 265-66 (1965).
8. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662,
671 (1896).
9. See Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 183 (1889).
10. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 308 (1931); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
163, 173 (1873); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717-19 (1969) (holding that
protection against multiple punishments for the same offense requires that credit for time served
on original sentence be credited after retrial and conviction), overruled on other grounds by Alabama
v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
11. 118 Wash. 2d 670, 826 P.2d 684 (1992).
12. Id. at 674, 826 P.2d at 686.
13. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
14. Id. at 2860 (overruling "same conduct" test in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990),
and adopting "same elements" test for analyzing double jeopardy same offense issue).
15. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
16. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860.
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proof of an additional fact the other does not, then the double jeopardy
same offense requirement has not been met.
17
Washington courts employ the "same evidence" test,'" which
follows the Blockburger test the United States Supreme Court reestab-
lished in Dixon.'
9
Employment of the Blockburger test, however, offers no guarantee
of an easy solution to the same offense issue. The proliferation of
separate writings by the Justices of the United States Supreme Court
in Dixon is one measure of the difficulties that arise in the application
of the Blockburger test. Perhaps an even more trenchant example of
these difficulties is two Florida court of appeals cases decided late in
1994: State v. Miranda" and State v. Johnson." In each of those
cases, a person was convicted of criminal contempt for violating a
domestic violence injunction.22 Subsequent to the criminal contempt
convictions, the State attempted to prosecute both individuals for the
Florida crime of aggravated stalking, based on the same set of facts
that constituted the violations of the domestic violence injunctions.23
The trial courts in both cases dismissed the aggravated stalking charges
on double jeopardy grounds. In each case the State appealed.24 Two
divisions of the Florida court of appeals reached opposite results based
on differing applications of the Blockburger test.
In State v. Johnson, a per curiam decision, the three-judge panel
had little difficulty in affirming the dismissal after applying the
Blockburger test:
In this case, as in Dixon, the substantive charge was subsumed
under the language of the injunction. There is no conceivable way
in which [Johnson] could have committed aggravated stalking
against the victim without also violating the terms of the injunction,
a crime for which he had already been convicted. In the language
of Dixon, aggravated stalking is "a species of lesser-included offense"
17. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
18. See State v. Calle, 125 Wash. 2d 769, 777, 888 P.2d 155, 159 (1995).
19. See id.; accord State v. Gocken, 127 Wash. 2d 95, 107, 896 P.2d 1267, 1273 (1995).
The first Washington case to discuss double jeopardy issues was State v. Reiff, 14 Wash. 664,
45 P. 318 (1896). There, the Washington Supreme Court held a successive prosecution for false
pretenses under § 234 of the Penal Code was not barred by WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9, after
defendant's motion to dismiss a larceny charge under § 53 of the Penal Code was granted. Id. at
666-68, 45 P. at 319. As the supreme court pointed out in Gocken, the test the court used in
Reiff was the Blockburger test. 127 Wash. 2d at 104, 896 P.2d at 1271.
20. 644 So. 2d 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
21. 644 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 654 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1995).
22. Miranda, 644 So. 2d at 343; Johnson, 644 So. 2d at 1028.
23. Miranda, 644 So. 2d at 343; Johnson, 644 So. 2d at 1029.
24. Miranda, 644 So. 2d at 343; Johnson, 644 So. 2d at 1028.
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of the contempt charge; the rule against double jeopardy thus barred
the subsequent prosecution for aggravated stalking."
In State v. Miranda, the court took a different view of the same
facts. Employing a closer analysis of the Blockburger test, the court
reasoned as follows:
We now examine the charges before us. Miranda was charged
with aggravated stalking under section 784.048(4). Therefore, both
the aggravated stalking charge and the contempt charge require
proof that an injunction for protection has been issued pursuant to
section 741.30. However, we must compare the elements of the
violated conditions of the injunction to the remaining elements of
aggravated stalking. Aggravated stalking requires proof that a
person "knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or
harasses another person." "Harasses" means "to engage in a course
of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial
emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose."
A definition is also provided for "course of conduct" which includes
a requirement that there be a "series of acts over a period of time."
No such requirements are contained in the elements of the violated
conditions of the injunction. The condition that Respondent not
"harass the Petitioner, either directly or indirectly, at any time or
place whatsoever," may be violated by a single act of "harassment"
as defined by its plain meaning since no statutory definition is
provided. Thus, the aggravated stalking charge includes elements
not included in the contempt charge. The fact that evidence of
repeated phone calls may constitute the proof to be adduced at both
the contempt trial and the aggravated stalking trial does not render
these charges the same offense. The focus in doing a Blockburger
analysis is on the statutory elements of the offenses and not on the
accusatory pleadings or proof to be adduced at trial in a particular
case. 26
Remarkably, the courts decided these cases within seven days of
each other. It seems manifest that the Blockburger test, rather than
illuminating difficult questions of double jeopardy analysis, can lead to
widely varying results that more often than not are sui generis because
of their unique fact patterns.
25. Johnson, 644 So. 2d at 1029 (citations omitted).
26. Miranda, 644 So. 2d at 345 (footnotes omitted).
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IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND CIVIL FORFEITURES
Double jeopardy challenges have increased in recent years and are
likely to continue multiplying. The author's recent computer search
revealed the words "double jeopardy" or "former jeopardy" have
appeared in Washington cases 456 times since 1902. Notably, 273, or
sixty percent, of those occurrences have been in the last fifteen years,
with only 183 occurrences in the previous seventy-eight years.
Criminal defendants have not become more resourceful, nor have
prosecutors become more oppressive. Rather, the most likely reason
for the increase in double jeopardy cases is the law of double jeopardy
has undergone a change in recent years as old assumptions have been
discarded. Many policymakers had assumed, for example, double
jeopardy did not apply where the conduct could be the subject of both
a criminal prosecution and a civil proceeding. Thus, civil forfeitures
had been immune from double jeopardy considerations because the
forfeitures were thought to be in rem actions against inanimate objects,
rather than actions against a person who might thereafter be subject to
a double punishment if prosecuted criminally.27 The United States
Supreme Court in Austin v. United States,2" and the Washington
Supreme Court following Austin in State v. Clark,29 however, have
dispensed with such a neat distinction by holding that civil forfeiture
proceedings are generally punitive in nature.
30
One example of issues that have arisen only recently and that
exemplify the difficulties in enforcing the law while abiding by the
strictures of double jeopardy is civil forfeiture in the context of drug
prosecutions. Washington's forfeiture statute provides the state may
seize all conveyances, money, negotiable instruments, and securities
used or intended to be used to facilitate the sale of a controlled
substance in violation of Washington's Uniform Controlled Substances
Act.31 Additionally, it allows the state to seize property furnished or
intended to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance in
violation of the Act and all personal property acquired in whole or in
27. The legal fiction that civil forfeiture is an in rein proceeding that does not punish the
possessor of the property forfeited was regarded with some degree of contempt by Judge Pratt of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, who noted that civil forfeiture is "a doctrine historically
based on animism." George C. Pratt & William B. Petersen, Civil Forfeiture in the Second
Circuit, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 653, 654 (1991).
28. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
29. 124 Wash. 2d 90, 875 P.2d 613 (1994).
30. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810; Clark, 124 Wash. 2d at 101, 875 P.2d at 618.
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.505(a)(4), (7) (1994).
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part with proceeds traceable to such an exchange.32 This provision
is civil, not criminal, and the person whose property has been seized
may contest the forfeiture before either the chief law enforcement
officer of the seizing agency or an administrative law judge.33
Because, depending on the nature of the property seized, such
forfeitures may be punishment,34 jeopardy attaches. As a result,
subsequent criminal convictions for the substantive drug offense
charged at the time of the seizure may be barred by double jeopardy.
These difficulties are not limited to the context of drug prosecu-
tions-we can expect to see cases in many other areas of law where
separate criminal and civil or administrative sanctions are imposed on
a party for the same conduct.
To avoid the double jeopardy bar in the area of civil forfeiture,
prosecutors can conduct the forfeiture hearing and criminal case in the
same proceeding. 3  This is because multiple punishments are
permissible if imposed in the same proceeding-they are barred only
if imposed in separate proceedings.36
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the prohibition against placing someone in double
jeopardy is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and observation and
enforcement of the prohibition have created some thorny problems for
courts to resolve. The Articles that follow this Preface will identify
and discuss these problems in the context of parallel criminal prosecu-
tions and civil forfeiture proceedings, and will propose some possible
means of ensuring that well-intentioned efforts to tackle our nation's
many ills do not violate the ancient ban against double jeopardy.
32. Id. § 69.50.505(a)(7).
33. See id. § 69.50.505(e).
34. See Clark, 124 Wash. 2d at 101, 875 P.2d at 618.
35. United States v. McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
36. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450-51 (1989); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S.
359, 368-69 (1983).
1996]
